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1. In his analysis of the operations of the mind, Reid distinguished sen-
sations from perceptions. According to Reid, sensations are non-intentional 
states of mind. They are normally occasioned by the action of external 
objects on our sense organs, but the causal relation at play here is merely a 
constant conjunction of events. Moreover, sensations, being states of mind, 
do not resemble the qualities in the external objects that occasion them.! 
In their turn, sensations are regularly followed by perceptions. These 
are intentional acts of mind whereby we conceive of qualities of external 
objects and believe in their existence. Again, the relation between sensa-
tions and perceptions is merely a constant conjunction of events. In Reid's 
terminology, this relation is a law of nature established by God, but it does 
not point to a necessary connection arising from the nature of things. We 
could have had sensations without perceptions or perceptions without sensa-
tions, if God had so decided and had framed differently our constitution.2 
In his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Reid introduced a thought 
experiment in order to determine "whether from sensation alone we can 
collect any notion of extension, figure, motion, and space."3 Reid imag-
ines a blind man that "by some strange distemper" has lost all notions of 
primary qualities he normally has by the sense oftouch. These include the 
conceptions of "the existence, figure, dimensions, or extension, either of 
his own body, or of any other."4 Reid asks whether the blind man would be 
capable of acquiring all these notions merely by means of sensations and 
the power of reasoning, which he supposes to remain intact. Reid subjects 
the blind man of his thought experiment to a series of sensory stimulations 
of increasing complexity, but no matter what sensations the blind man 
receives, the subject cannot possibly infer from them the conceptions of 
primary qualities he has lost. 5 
By means of this thought experiment, we can direct our attention to 
the nature of sensations, and come to realize that they do not resemble the 
primary qualities of external objects. Since sensations do not resemble the 
primary qualities of external objects, the blind man could not possibly infer 
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from sensations alone what these qualities would be like.6 
In a recent book, Ryan Nichols criticizes this experiment by saying 
that Reid did not take into account a more complicated case of sensory 
stimulation by touch that had been presented by Condillac in his Treatise 
on Sensations (1754). In trying to address this objection on behalf of Reid, 
Nichols considers an early pre-Inquiry manuscript, where Reid indeed 
considers a more complicated case of sensory stimulation by touch. I argue 
that Condillac's more complex case of sensory stimulation is successful 
only insofar as Condillac more or less surreptitiously reintroduces a rela-
tion of resemblance between a certain set of sensations and the qualities in 
the external object. But the point of Reid's thought experiment is precisely 
to direct our attention to the fact that no matter how varied and complex 
our sensations are, they do not resemble the qualities of an external object. 
2. The main purpose ofCondillac's Treatise on Sensations is to show that 
we derive "all our knowledge and all our faculties" from mere sensation'? 
Condillac asks us to imagine a "statue," an adult human being who has no 
innate abilities, no innate ideas of objects, and no prior sensory experience 
of objects, but still has the capacity to experience sensations. He subjects 
each sense of the statue to stimulation in order to determine what it would 
be able to know merely from the sensations it experiences. Condillac denies 
that the statue would be able to derive intentional conceptions of its own 
body, of other bodies, and of the space they occupy from the sensations it 
has through the senses of smell, hearing, and sight. It is only by touch that 
we get to know that we have a body, that there are other bodies beside our 
own, and that there is a space where they both move.8 Condillac specifies 
a condition for the formation of these notions: 
It is thus evidentthat we will not proceed from our sensations to a knowledge 
of objects except insofar as those sensations produce the phenomenon of 
extension; and because an object is a continuum formed by the contiguity of 
other extended objects, the sensation that represents it must be a continuum 
formed by the contiguity of other extended sensations.9 
Nichols notices that this is an "obscure necessary condition for acquiring intentional 
perceptual content" and that "[ d]espite what is said in the last part ofthis sentence, 
Condillac recognizes that 'sensations belong only to the mind' and do not 'extend' 
beyond it. After all, if sensations are themselves extended, then having sensa-
tions ipso facto generates an awareness of extension." 1 0 But why should not 
this be what Condillac means in his remark, perhaps without realizing the 
inconsistency with other passages of his work? We can acquire intentional 
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concepts of mind-independent external objects precisely by way of an in-
ference (or judgment) from the properties of sensations (or collections of 
sensations) to the properties of bodies. This judgment is possible because 
of the resemblance existing between (at least some of) the properties of 
sensations and those of the objects. Only if we are aware of a collection 
of extended sensations that are contiguous to each other and form a con-
tinuum, can we ultimately become aware of an external object. But Reid, 
as we have seen, denies that whatever collection of tangible sensations we 
consider could ever resemble the properties of external objects, and that 
therefore it could ever yield the notion itself of extension. 
3. In Condillac's reconstruction, the statue learns first that it has a body 
before it can recognize that there are other bodies. Our body is not only 
extended but also impenetrable, that is, it excludes other bodies from the 
same place. Strictly speaking, "[t]his impenetrability is not a sensation," 
and so we do not sense the impenetrability itself of bodies. 11 However, it 
is from the sensation of solidity that we can infer that two bodies cannot 
occupy the same place at the same time. It seems that we can do that pre-
cisely because there is a resemblance relation between the sensation and 
the quality, as appears from the following remark of Condillac: 
Since the essence of this sensation of solidity is to represent at one and 
the same moment two things that exclude each other, the mind will not 
perceive solidity as one of those states in which it finds only itself; it will 
perceive it necessarily as a state in which it finds two things that are mutually 
exclusive and as a result it will perceive it [solidity] in these two things. 12 
In touching its chest with its hand, the statue has two simultaneous sensations of 
solidity answering each other. By these sensations the statue not only discovers 
two extended and contiguous body parts excluding each other from the same place, 
but it also finds its "I" (its moi) in each of them. The statue will literally perceive 
itselfto be "outside of itself," or, better, it will perceive itself in two differ-
ent bodies that exclude each other from the same place at the same time. 
In order to form the notion that these bodies in which it finds itself form a 
single body, the statue has to move continuously its hand over its own body. 
In this manner, "it will experience a continuity of self at its fingertips," it 
will experience its body as forming a single continuum of parts contiguous 
to each other. \3 
Insofar as the statue only touches itself, it will conceive of itself as 
the only thing existing. But in touching another object and not receiving 
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an answering sensation from it, the statue will come to conceive of other 
objects beside itself. 
4. In his reconstruction ofCondillac's experiment, Nichols stresses that 
in order to develop intentional conceptions of external objects, the subject 
must experience at least three simultaneous sensations: in the case of the 
perception of impenetrability, he individuates the two answering sensations 
of solidity felt in the hand and chest (or the arm), and an additional sensa-
tion (or set of sensations) constituted either by the difference of temperature 
of the two touching parts, or by the muscular feelings that accompany the 
movement of the hand. But from the point of view of Reid, the question 
to pose when confronted with such a rich array of sensations is always the 
same: does this collection of sensations resemble the primary qualities of 
external objects? If it does, then one can infer notions of external objects 
from the collection of sensations. If the array of sensations does not resemble 
external objects, then it cannot yield the notions of external objects by itself. 
5. Although Reid fails to take into account such complex cases of con-
fluence of sensations in the text of the Inquiry, he does consider them in 
an early manuscript. Nichols analyzes two particular cases present in this 
manuscript. In the first case, Reid tries to determine whether "we perceive 
the Extension of aBody by its touching any two remote Parts of our Body." 14 
The question to be answered, according to Reid, is "how we came to learn 
the Distance of these two parts of our Body the Head & feet for instance." 15 
In other words, how can we come to learn the distance between our head 
and our feet by moving our hand from one to the other? 
Suppose then I say that I learn the Distance of my Head & feet, by moving 
my hand from one to the other. The Velocity of this Motion & the Time 
give me a perception of the distance between them. And I acknowledge 
I can find no better account of the matter.16 
Reid thinks that in order to know the distance between our head and feet by 
the motion of our hand from one to the other, we would have to compute 
it by multiplying the velocity of the motion by its duration. It follows that 
unless we know beforehand the velocity and the duration of the motion, we 
cannot know the distance between the two body parts. Reid indeed goes on 
to specify the two necessary conditions for the computation ofthe distance 
between the two body parts: 
But ifthis is the true Account it follows First that the perception of Time 
or Duration must be previous to that of Extension & consequently that 
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without Memory it were impossible to have acquired any Idea of Exten-
sion. But 2ly By this Account we must not onely have the Idea of Duration 
previous to that of Extension but also that of Velocity. And it seems very 
hard to conceive that the Idea of Velocity should be prior to and more 
Simple than that of Space or Extension. 17 
Nichols quotes only the first condition and moves a series of objections to 
Reid that seem to miss the point of what Reid wants to say, that is, that a 
preliminary know ledge of the duration and velocity of the motion of our hand 
is necessary for the computation of the distance between two body parts. 
According to Nichols, Reid says the subject must be aware of the dura-
tion of the motion "presumably [ ... ] on the grounds that this is necessary 
for the two experiences [of touching the feet and the head] to be uniquely 
individuated by the subject."18 He adds: "I find it difficult to pinpoint the 
way in which the subject must be necessarily aware of duration in order 
to individuate these two tactile sensations."19 Nichols' difficulty is not 
surprising since he ascribes to Reid a different intention from the one we 
have seen at work in the manuscript: according to Reid, the knowledge of 
duration is not necessary in order to individuate the two tactile sensations, 
but in order to be able to compute the distance of the two body parts from 
the duration and velocity of the hand's motion. 
On the basis of his mistaken assumption about the meaning of the 
manuscript, Nichols then goes on to attack Reid: "Either [1] the subject is 
or [2] is not able to be aware of unique sensory experiences without having 
a concept of duration."20 
If [1], then Nichols concludes, "Reid's criticism is misguided," that is, 
it is not true that a perception of duration is necessary for identifying two 
distinct sensations.21 
If [2], two consequences would follow for Reid: either [a] Reid did not 
provide any proofthat knowledge of duration is necessary for individuating 
two distinct sensations, or [b] Reid is wrong in thinking that know ledge of 
duration is necessary for individuating two distinct sensations. Nichols then 
has an easy time showing that I can remember two distinct and successive 
sensations X and Y, without needing to remember the time between X and Y. 22 
But if we tum to what Reid actually says, he does not seem to be wor-
ried about our possibility of knowing the duration between two successive 
sensations by the use of our memory. What mostly worries him is the pos-
sibility of knowing the velocity of the motion of our hand before having 
an idea of space: "it seems very hard to conceive that the Idea of Velocity 
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should be prior to and more Simple than that of Space or Extension." 23 
6. In another part of the same manuscript, Reid considers a more com-
plicated case of sensory stimulation. Reid first imagines the blind man to 
be able to move his limbs: 
When he moved his hand or foot [ ... ] he would be conscious of a certain 
Effort {of Mind} and a feeling consequent it. This feeling he might {call} 
Motion but it is certainly extremely different from our Notion of Motion 
for it would include no Notion of Space or change of Place. He moves his 
hand variously hither and thither [ ... ] in the air. These he may conceive 
as various Modifications of what he has called Motion in his Hand but 
as that Motion includes not extension so neither can its Modifications.24 
From this passage, Nichols infers that "Reid concedes that the agent has an 
intentional concept that he would associate with motion, even if it is incho-
ate and indeterminate,"25 or that "the subject may form an eviscerated idea 
of motion."26 Notwithstanding Nichols' qualifications, Reid makes clear 
that what the blind man calls motion is a "feeling" and that this feeling "is 
certainly extremely different from our Notion of Motion for it would include 
no Notion of Space or change ofPlace."27 In short, Reid is again stating his 
well-known thesis: sensations do not resemble the qualities of external objects 
that we get to know through the subsequent and different acts of perception. 
By moving his hand, the blind man would end up touching his face. 
He would then have new sensations both in his hand and in his face ac-
companying the sensation of muscular effort characteristic of the motion 
of his hand to his face. These sensations would vary according to the 
different parts of the face he touches and the motions he makes. Accord-
ing to Nichols, Reid is here inching closer to a situation similar to that 
described by Condillac in the Treatise: there, the answering sensations 
of solidity of two touching body parts conjoined with the accompanying 
muscular effort were sufficient to produce an intentional concept of a pri-
mary quality.28 But what is Reid's judgment of this particular situation? 
Let us no[w] consider what idea he can from all this Collect of his Face. 
It seems a vastly complex one Made up of an Effort of his hand variously 
modified as it passes over the severall parts of his face the feelings of the 
Swelling ofthe Muscles and flexures of the Joints of his hands and fingers 
the feelings of his face that correspond with these. When I endeavour to 
put all these together they Seem not to have the least Resemblance to my 
Idea of a Face.29 
Reid further insists that the idea the blind man has must be the work of years 
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and be "the Effect of an infinite Number of {successive} feelings & various 
modifications ofthese feelings joined together by habits and associations."3o 
But even "when these feelings are all joined together they seem to me notto 
convey the least Idea of Space. "31 Reid's underlying assumption is clear: sen-
sations, either singly or joined in collections, do not resemble the qualities of 
external objects, and so any modification or combination of sensations cannot 
possibly convey the ideas of qualities of external objects. Nichols says that 
Reid is at risk of attacking a straw man when he hypothesizes that the 
subject's sensation experiences collectively do not "have the least Resem-
blance to my Idea of a Face." Why must someone like Condillac claim 
that the subject's sensations must resemble the intentional contents to 
which they give rise?32 
Sensations (or collections of sensations) do not have to resemble the inten-
tional notions of primary qualities they give rise to, if they can only "give 
rise to" them in the manner explained by Reid in the Inquiry, that is, by a 
natural principle of our constitution: this is a law established by God such 
that sensations immediately suggest the acts of perception whereby we 
conceive of external objects and believe in their existence. But the goal of 
the thought experiment is to determine whether sensations (either singly or 
joined together) by themselves can ever give rise to intentional notions of 
primary qualities. According to Reid, no inference could ever be made from 
mere sensations (or mere collections of sensations) to the qualities of ex-
ternal objects, unless some relation of similarity existed between sensations 
and these qualities. However, as Reid observes, sensations do not resemble 
qualities of external objects. Rather than leading us to see the deficiencies 
of Reid's thought experiment, Condillac's example should make us notice 
the inconsistency ofCondillac's position, and his surreptitious reintroduc-
tion of the copy principle between sensations and qualities in the Treatise. 33 
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1 Abbreviations: Inquiry: Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind 
on the Principles a/Common Sense, ed. Derek R. Brookes (University Park, Pa.: 
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Treatise: Etienne Bonnot Abbe de Condillac, A Treatise on the Sensations, in 
Philosophical Writings a/Etienne Bonnot, Abbe de Condillac, vol. 1, trans. 
Franklin Philip with the collaboration of Harlan Lane (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1982). 
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Nichols: Ryan Nichols, Thomas Reid's Theory o/Perception (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2007). 
MS 811I121 (followed by folio number): Aberdeen University Library MS 
213118111/21. 
I have not rectified the spelling and capitalization of the original manuscript. I 
have occasionally added punctuation. 
2 Reid also says that sensations suggest the notion and belief of external 
qualities, and that they are natural signs ofthese qualities. Words in our artificially 
constructed languages corne to suggest the objects they stand for to our minds, but 
they do not resemble the objects they signify, nor is there a necessary connection 
arising from the nature of things between words and the objects they suggest. 
Likewise, sensations suggest notions of external qualities, but do not resemble 
them, nor is there a necessary connection arising from the nature ofthings between 
sensations and the notions of external qualities. However, while we become able 
to interpret signs of artificial languages only by custom and experience, we pass 
immediately from the experience of a sensation to the conception and belief of an 
external quality. Sensations suggest immediately the perception of the qualities of 
external objects because of an innate law of nature, established by God. Reid also 
calls this law "an original principle of our constitution" (Inquiry V.2, p. 58/23-26 
and V.3, p. 60/32-34). 
3 Inquiry Y.6, p. 65/14-16. 
4 Inquiry Y.6, p. 65/24-25. 
5 Reid considers six cases of sensory stimulation. In the first four cases, the 
blind man is supposed to be immovably fixed in one place. The blind man is first 
pricked with a pin. He experiences a sensation of pain, but, as Reid points out, he 
cannot infer from it neither the figure nor the existence of the pin. Next, a blunt 
object is applied to his body with a gradually increasing degree of force "until it 
bruises him" (Inquiry Y.6, p. 66/1). The blind man will experience a succession of 
sensations, but again he will not be able to conclude anything from them with regard 
to the existence and extension of the body affecting him. Thirdly, Reid imagines that 
"the body applied to him touches a larger or a lesser part of his body" (Inquiry Y.6, 
p. 66/8-9). The resulting simultaneous sensations that the blind man experiences 
cannot give him the notion of "the extension or dimensions" of the object, unless 
he has the previous notions of the "dimensions and figure" of his body to serve as 
a measure for the object his body touches. But, Reid claims, the blind man does 
not even know that he has a body, nor can he acquire this notion by the sensations 
it experiences. In the fourth case, "a body is drawn along his hands and face while 
they are at rest" (Inquiry Y.6, pp. 66/18). This motion occasions a new sensation, 
or a succession of sensations, but again Reid thinks that these feelings cannot give 
to the blind man the notion of space or motion. In the fifth case, the subject of the 
experiment "makes some instinctive effort to move his head or hand, but no mo-
tion follows, either on account of external resistance or of palsy" (Inquiry Y.6, p. 
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66/27-29). The sensation of effort which the subject experiences cannot convey 
him the notions of space and motion. In the last case considered, the subject moves 
one of his limbs by instinct: "He has here a new sensation, which accompanies the 
flexure of joints, and the swelling of muscles" (Inquiry V.6, p. 66/32-34). Again, 
Reid confesses that he finds altogether mysterious and unintelligible how this 
sensation can convey to the blind man his notions of space and motion. 
6 At the end of his presentation of the thought experiment, Reid summarizes 
his conclusion: "Upon the whole, it appears, that our philosophers have imposed 
upon themselves, and upon us, in pretending to deduce from sensation the first 
origin of our notions of external existences, of space, motion, and extension, and all 
the primary qualities of body, that is, the qualities whereof we have the most clear 
and distinct conception" (Inquiry V.6, p. 67/1-5). These notions are neither ideas 
of sensation nor of reflection since "they have no resemblance to any sensation, 
or to any operation of our minds" (Inquiry V.6, p. 6717-8). We see that Reid here 
is explicitly grounding the impossibility of deriving notions of primary qualities 
from sensations on the dissimilarity between the two. 
7 Treatise, Precis, p. 155. 
8 While Condillac thinks that the sensations experienced by smell and hearing 
are unextended, he admits that color sensations are experienced as extended in two 
dimensions. But a statue limited to the sense of sight would be unable to perceive 
the boundaries between the different color expanses it experiences, its attention 
being drawn primarily to the chromatic qualities. Thus, the statue would be unable 
to recognize that these color patches have shapes, that they are contiguous to each 
other and form a single extended continuum. Somebody like Reid, who thinks that 
the mind by being immaterial is necessarily unextended, could point out to Condillac 
that even this rudimentary experience of colors as extended expanses would turn 
colors into properties incompatible with the mind. But Condillac seems to have 
thought that the extension that is experienced immediately by sight is perceived 
as being merely phenomenal and mind-dependent. In order to perceive extension 
as a property of an external and mind-independent object, one has to perceive the 
object as "a continuum formed by the contiguity of several other extended objects" 
(Treatise 11.4.1, p. 230). But, as we have seen, the statue does not experience 
color patches as contiguous and as forming a continuum. On the status of color in 
Condillac, see Lome Falkenstein, "Condillac's Paradox," Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 43 (2005), 403-435. 
9 Treatise 11.4.2, p. 230. 
10 Nichols, p. 99. Nichols' quotes are from Treatise 11.4.3, pp. 230. This is a 
passage that indeed seems to contradict other passages where Condillac seems 
to assume that at least some of our sensations are extended. This is a problem 
recognized in the literature on Condillac: see L. Falkenstein, "Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2007 Edition), 
EdwardN.Zalta(ed.):URL=<http://plato.st~ford.edu/archivesIsum2007/entriesl 
condillac/> . 
11 Treatise, 11.5.3, p. 233. 
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22 See Nichols, pp. 102-103. 
23 MS 8111121, fo1. lr. At the time he wrote this manuscript, Reid was teach-
ing physics to his students at King's College, Aberdeen, and he must have often 
explained that the average velocity of a body is equal to space (distince) divided 
by time. Indeed, it seems that the conception of velocity presupposes those of 
space and time. How can we conceive of a body moving at a certain speed without 
conceiving that body as being able to move through a determinate portion of space 
in a certain time? I think this order of considerations were in the back of Reid's 
mind. 
24 MS 8111121, fo1. 1 v. 
25 Nichols, p. 104. 
26 Nichols, p. 105. 
27 MS 8/11121, fo1. Iv. 
28 According to Nichols, both cases of sensory stimulation by touch present 
in the manuscript fall short of addressing Condillac's thought experiment, because 
Reid considers only two successive tactile sensations in them, instead of three 
simultaneous tactile sensations (see Nichols, p. 103). However, as Nichols points 
out, in the case of the blind man touching his face, "the agent nearly simultaneously 
experiences at least three distinct sensations" (Nichols, pp. 104-105). 
29 MS 8/11/21, fo1. 2r. 
30 MS 8/11121, fo1. 2r. 
31 MS 8111121, fo1. 2r. 
32 Nichols, p. 105. 
33 I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of James E. Bruce. 
200 
